Abstract-A digital marketplace (DMP) is a market-based framework in which a network selection mechanism is facilitated through a variant of procurement first-price sealed-bid auction, i.e., wireless network operators (NOs) bid for the right to transport the subscriber's requested service over their infrastructure. In this paper, we create an economic model of this mechanism, and we characterize the equilibrium under generic assumptions about the cost distributions of the NOs. Furthermore, the equilibrium is explicitly derived under more specific assumptions about the model, i.e., two NOs and costs drawn from uniform distributions. In this case, we also characterize the expected prices that the subscriber has to pay depending on their preferences about the service, e.g., trading off quality for a lower price. Finally, we provide a numerical analysis of the case with more than two NOs.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE world of mobile communications is becoming increasingly diverse in terms of different wireless access technologies available. Global System for Mobile Communications, third-generation technology, Wi-Fi, and the cuttingedge fourth-generation technology Long-Term Evolution are gradually being rolled out in many countries, including the USA [1] , and the U.K. [2] . In an environment of such diversity and heterogeneity, where each wireless access technology has its own distinct characteristics, network selection mechanisms provide a resource-efficient way of handling communication services by matching the services' required quality with the characteristics of a particular access technology [3] . The importance of these mechanisms is emphasized by the fact that multimode smartphones (iPhones, Android phones, and BlackBerry phones) and tablets (iPads and Android tablets) currently dominate the market, thus enabling users to connect to many of the available wireless access technologies. This diversity opens exciting and new possibilities in both a technological and an economic sense. The exclusive one-toone mapping between network operators (NOs) and subscribers need no longer hold; when requesting a bearer service, the network selection mechanism will be responsible for selecting the NO (access technology) that best matches the required quality requirements of the service. From the subscribers' perspective, this permits the ability to seamlessly connect anytime and anywhere, and to connect to the technology offering the highest quality available for the best price, which is a paradigm referred to as always best connected [4] . From the NOs' perspective, the integration of wireless access technologies will allow for more efficient usage of network resources; hence, this will be the most economic way of providing both universal coverage and broadband access [3] .
However, there also exists the possibility of a "tussle" since there are many different actors with opposing interests involved [5] . For example, it is in the best interest of subscribers to obtain the highest quality of the service for the lowest price. NOs, on the other hand, aim to maximize their profit by performing efficient load balancing. Furthermore, the situation may become even more complex should the service provision be decoupled from the NOs, i.e., if the service provision is handled by a separate entity, such as a service provider, whereas NOs are left with handling of the transport provision [6] . Therefore, the problem of network selection, which was considered technologically difficult, can also be considered a problem of economics where wireless access, which is traded on a per connection basis, is an electronic good that is sold to the subscribers.
In this paper, we analyze the network selection mechanism proposed in a digital marketplace (DMP), which is a market-based framework where NOs compete in a procurement auction-based setting for the right to transport the subscriber's requested service over their infrastructure [7] . Within this framework, the network selection mechanism is akin to a market selling mechanism where NOs assume the role of the sellers/bidders and subscribers are the buyers of the transport services offered by the NOs. In this way, the DMP strives to address the tussle between the actors involved and thus attempts to address both the technological and economic constraints of the problem.
We create a simple economic model of the auction and characterize the equilibrium under generic assumptions about the cost distributions of the NOs. Furthermore, the equilibrium 0018-9545 © 2013 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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is explicitly derived under more specific assumptions about the model, i.e., two NOs and costs drawn from uniform distributions. In this case, we also characterize the expected prices the subscriber has to pay depending on their preferences about the service, e.g., trading off quality for a lower price. Finally, we provide a numerical analysis of the case with more than two NOs. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the historical context is given. Section III provides an overview of the DMP, whereas Section IV presents the results of the analysis. Finally, Section V draws the conclusions and summarizes the key learning.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Over the last decade, several papers have explored the problem of intelligent network selection in heterogeneous wireless access networks. Wang and Kuo have provided an upto-date survey of the mainstream approaches to the network selection problem covering utility and game theory, fuzzy logic, multiple-attribute decision-making, combinatorial optimization, and Markov chains [8] . Liu et al. proposed an algorithm for optimal network selection, which mainly aims at optimizing energy consumption of the user equipment [9] . Espi et al. presented a machine learning approach to network selection; in particular, they utilized a Hopfield neural network to solve the underlying optimization problem [10] . Antoniou and Pisillides and Charilas et al. modeled the problem as a noncooperative game between wireless access networks, with the aim of obtaining the best possible tradeoff between the efficiency and the available capacity of networks and satisfying the requested quality by the subscribers at the same time [11] , [12] . Ormond et al. proposed an algorithm for cost-oriented and performance-aware network selection that maximizes consumer surplus [13] , [14] . Niyato et al. proposed two algorithms based on evolutionary game theory for a network selection mechanism that performs intelligent load balancing so that network congestion and performance degradation can be avoided [15] . Additionally, they modeled the user churning behavior in heterogeneous wireless access networks using evolutionary game theory [16] . Khan et al. modeled the problem as a procurement second-price sealed-bid auction where NOs bid for the right to service the subscriber's request [17] , [18] . Zhu et al. built upon the work reported in [15] , and they explored the dynamics of network selection, using Bayesian evolutionary game theory, in an environment where subscribers have only limited (incomplete) information about the preferences of each other [19] . Finally, Irvine et al. proposed a market-based framework called DMP where NOs compete in a variant of a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction for the right to transport the subscriber's requested service over their infrastructure [7] , [20] , [21] .
III. DIGITAL MARKETPLACE
The DMP is a market-based framework for trading wireless communication services. In its simplest form, there are three main groups of actors involved in the operation of the DMP: subscribers, NOs, and a market provider. The subscribers are the end-users of the communication services, and they act as the buyers in the DMP. The NOs, on the other hand, act as the sellers/bidders. Finally, the market provider is tasked with operating the DMP, thus providing a common platform for all actors involved.
It is left open-ended who should be the market provider; however, one of the following three choices is the most likely: a regulatory body, a consortium of NOs, or a single NO on behalf of the regulatory body [21] .
The process of negotiation (or the network selection mechanism) in the DMP is based on a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction. Unlike in a standard procurement first-price sealed-bid auction, the winning bid is a weighted (convex) combination of both the NO's monetary bid and their reputation rating; we will refer to it as the compound bid. The NO is elected as the winner of the auction if their compound bid is the lowest in value, and it accrues their monetary bid minus the cost of supporting the service. The monetary bid is equivalent to the price of supporting the service by the NO. The precise definition of the price is left open-ended; one possibility, for example, would be to charge the buyer per unit of bandwidth. The weights in the compound bid are set by the subscriber before each auction and are announced to the NOs. This effectively gives the subscriber the freedom to choose any combination ranging from a low price for the service but with a poor quality, to a service with high quality but for a high price [7] .
Since the communication services are traded on an individual service level, it might be difficult for the subscriber to judge the overall quality of the services supplied by a particular NO [21] . Therefore, one of the fundamental assumptions governing the operation of the DMP is that, by registering in the DMP, NOs agree to report on their contract fulfilment to the market provider, i.e., they agree to report a binary value denoting the success in delivering the service to the subscriber within the agreed quality-of-service (QoS) bounds [7] . The value of 0 denotes a failure, whereas the value of 1 denotes a success. The latest d(d > 1) reports are then used to compute the reputation rating of the NO that will be used when a new service request arrives in the marketplace. Hence, assuming that NO i admitted t service requests, the formula for computing a reputation rating update is as follows (cf. [7, Section 3.2]):
where report k i denotes the kth binary report of NO i. Note that (1) implies r t+1 i = 0 if NO i has successfully delivered d services to the subscriber, whereas it implies r t+1 i = 1 if NO i has failed in all d attempts. Furthermore, (1) implies that if the operator is consistently unreliable, their performance is accordingly reflected by their reputation rating history. Similarly, one failure in delivering the service does not immediately render a NO unreliable; rather, it marginally affects their updated reputation rating. At the same time, at the end of each contract, the subscriber may report on their satisfaction [or quality of experience (QoE)] with the service, e.g., by submitting a mean opinion score in the case of real-time services and the achieved throughput in the case of nonreal-time services. The reputation rating update formula in (1) could be then modified to incorporate QoE, e.g., by taking an appropriately weighted composition of both NO's and subscriber's reports. (See [7] and [20] - [24] for a more in-depth treatment of the reputation rating system maintained by the DMP, and [25] - [28] 
denotes actions of all other players different from i, and θ i ∈ Θ i represents the type of player i. Letting Θ = × i∈N Θ i , the joint probability distribution of θ ∈ Θ is given by F (θ), which is assumed to be common knowledge among the players [29] .
In game Γ B , a pure strategy for player i is function ψ i : Θ i → S i , where for each type θ i ∈ Θ i , ψ i (θ i ) specifies the action from the feasible set S i that type θ i would choose. Therefore, player i's pure strategy set Ψ i is the set of all such functions.
Player i's expected utility given a profile of pure strategies
where the expectation is taken over the realizations of the players' types, i.e., θ ∈ Θ. Now, in game Γ B , strategy profile (ψ * 1 , . . . , ψ * N ) is a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of game
A. Problem Definition and Assumptions
The formal description of the network selection mechanism employed in the DMP is as follows. The model is a modified version of procurement first-price sealed-bid auction. Thus, formally, it represents a Bayesian game of incomplete information, i.e., Γ B . There are n NOs who bid for the right to sell their product to the subscriber such that n = |N |, where N denotes the set of all NOs.
Let β :
denote the compound bid, where w price denotes the weight that the subscriber attaches to the price of the service (price weight, in short), w penalty denotes the weight that the subscriber attaches to the reputation of the NOs (reputation weight, in short), b i is the monetary bid (or offered price) submitted by NO i, and r i is the reputation of NO i. Each NOs i is characterized by utility function u i such that
is an n-tuple of all NOs costs, and r = (r i , r −i ) is an n-tuple of all NO reputations. The winner of the auction is determined as the NO whose compound bid is the lowest one, i.e., NO i is the winner if
In the event that there is a tie, i.e.,
the winner is randomly selected with equal probability. Moreover, it is assumed that the price and reputation weights (w price , w penalty ) are announced by the buyer to all NOs before the auction. Thus, there is no uncertainty in knowing how much the subscriber values the offered price of the service over the reputation of the NO (or vice versa). Furthermore
To simplify the notation, it is assumed throughout the remainder of this paper that w = w price . This simplifies the definition of the compound bid in (4) to
Note, however, that this assumption could potentially lead to a situation where NOs manipulate the knowledge of w to increase their profits by overcharging the subscriber. Therefore, to circumvent such an eventuality, the subscriber would only consider offers such that
where v ∈ (0, 1] is the subscriber's valuation, and it is private knowledge [7] . The subscriber's valuation is effectively equivalent to a secret (or hidden) reserve price [30] . This creates an additional uncertainty about the auction that each NO needs to incorporate in their equilibrium bidding strategies. To elaborate further, by setting a secret reserve valuation, the subscriber creates a phantom bidder characterized by reputation rating r 0 and by submitting bid b 0 such that v = β(b 0 , r 0 ), and it therefore risks not obtaining a service offer from any NO if v < β(b i , r i ) for all i ∈ N . Therefore, the solution presented in this paper would have to be modified by including the phantom bidder in the derivation of the equilibrium bidding strategies. However, to keep the analysis analytically tractable, we do not incorporate this assumption in this paper.
Following the standard assumptions from the auction literature [31] , the set of NOs N is finite, and the NOs are risk neutral, i.e., they seek to maximize their expected profits.
Furthermore, the subscriber is risk neutral and does not have any budget constraints, i.e., the subscriber is prepared to accept any offer from the NOs.
Costs c i for each NO i are private knowledge. Thus, they are particular realizations of the random variables C i for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, it is assumed that each cost is scaled/normalized within the range [0, 1], and identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) over [0, 1] according to some continuous (and atomless) probability distribution that admits distribution function F C and associated density function f C such that f C is locally bounded away from zero over the interval [0, 1]. To keep the specification fairly generic, we do not explicitly decompose the costs into the underlying components such as interconnection charges, infrastructure fixed costs, etc. (See [32] - [34] for an in-depth coverage of the problem.) Furthermore, we recognize that various NOs will have different architecture, topology, infrastructure, etc., and that this impacts the costs to support the service. To capture the variation in costs, we employ an i.i.d. random variable to assign a cost to a particular NO at the time of the service request. This further aids generality of the results presented in this paper.
The reputation ratings r i for each NO i are common knowledge, i.e., their values are publicly disclosed to the subscriber and to every NO involved in the DMP. This makes the reputation system in the DMP similar to that found in eBay, for example, where the buyers of the goods leave sellers feedback, which over time, is perceived as reputation and is publicly available [35] . Furthermore, it is assumed that each r i ∈ [0, 1], such that the higher the reputation is, the lower rating r i will be.
Bidding strategy functions b i : [0, 1] → R + are nonnegative in value for all i ∈ N . The aim is to solve the game for purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, as defined in (3).
B. Existing Results
The preliminary analysis of the problem has been conducted by Konka et al. [36] , [37] . (For brevity, we only include the important results, and we refer the reader to the aforementioned papers for full coverage of the initial analysis of the problem).
Theorem 1: The following are the existing results. Suppose c i is i.i.d. over the interval [0, 1] for all i ∈ N , and r i ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N is common knowledge. 1) Let N 0 ⊆ N be the set of all those NOs with the lowest reputation rating. If w = 0, then every NO j ∈ N 0 will have an incentive to bid abnormally high, i.e., b j → ∞, whereas every remaining NO k ∈ N \ N 0 will be indifferent to the value of their bid. 2) If w = 1, then the (symmetric) equilibrium bidding strategy functions of the standard procurement first-price sealed-bid auction
for all i ∈ N constitute a (symmetric) pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the DMP variant of a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction.
3) If r i = r j for all i = j and w = 0, then the (symmetric) equilibrium bidding strategy functions in (7) constitute a (symmetric) pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the DMP variant of a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction. The formal proof of Conclusion 2 in Theorem 1 can be found in [36] (cf. [36, Proposition 2]), whereas the formal proof of Conclusions 1 and 3 can be found in [37] (cf. [37, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1]).
C. Generic Case
To further elaborate upon the conclusions summarized in Theorem 1, it is possible to transform the problem from a bidding problem with symmetric-type (or cost) distributions into a bidding problem with asymmetric-type distributions. This type of bidding problem has already been researched by the economic community, both in a very specific setting (two bidders with specific-type distributions) [38] , [39] and in a very general setting (n bidders with arbitrary-type distributions) [40] , [41] ; hence, there exist solutions that are applicable to the problem at hand.
To transform the problem, recall the utility function for each NO i
and let
(Note that the new bid is just an alias for the compound bid, and in fact, they are equivalent;
Substituting (9) back into the utility function yields
If we further let
the utility function simplifies to
To avoid ambiguity, we shall refer toĉ i as costs-hat andb i as bids-hat while still referring to c i as costs and b i as bids. Moreover, note that, since both w and r i are assumed to be given to the NOs (i.e., they cannot directly modify their values), the costs-hat and bids-hat are simply convex (and hence, linear) combinations involving costs and bids, respectively [see (8) and (10)]. Therefore, a NO bidding their costs-hat is equivalent to a NO bidding their cost. As a result of this transformation, costs-hatĉ i for each NO i are distributed over the interval
With these results at hand, we can proceed with the analysis of the game. It is sufficient to consider only the case when w ∈ (0, 1), and at least one NO is characterized by a different reputation rating from the other NOs, i.e., there exists i ∈ N such that r i = r j for all i = j and j ∈ N . The remaining cases are already included in Theorem 1. Furthermore, let F i be the distribution function ofĉ i for all i ∈ N , and without loss of generality, let NO 1 be characterized by the lowest reputation rating, i.e., r 1 ≤ r i for all i ∈ N such that i = 1. If there exists j ∈ N such that j = 1 and r 1 = r j , then we make an additional assumption that there exists δ > 0 such that F i is strictly logconcave over
First, note that, under the generic assumptions specified in Section IV-A, the problem satisfies the following regularity conditions.
Proposition 2: The regularity conditions are as follows.
1) The support of
with derivative f i locally bounded away from zero over this interval. 3) F i is atomless. The formal proof of Proposition 2 and any other proposition (unless stated otherwise) is given in the Appendix.
The regularity conditions in Proposition 2 correspond to the regularity assumptions on type distributions put forward by Lebrun [41] (cf. [41, Assumption A.1]). Therefore, since our problem satisfies Lebrun's assumptions, his results are applicable to our problem. In equilibrium, the bids of each NO equalb i =b i (ĉ i ), whereb i is the equilibrium bidding function. Denote byĉ i (b i ) ≡b −1 i (b i ) an inverse equilibrium bidding function for each NO. Therefore, the expected utility for each i ∈ N is
) is the probability that NO i is the lowest bidder. The first-order condition for maximizing i's expected utility leads to a system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations (ODEs), i.e.,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. As shown in [41] , there exists one and only one solution to the system, which is given in the following. Proposition 3: Here, the characterization of the equilibrium is described. There exists one and only one pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium where NOs submit at least their costs-hat. In every such equilibrium, NO i ∈ J, where J is a subset of N such that J = {j|1 ≤ j ≤ n andĉ j <b}, and
follows a bid functionb i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Moreover, there existsb ∈ (ĉ 2 ,b) such that, for all i ∈ J, there exists a continuous extension ofb i to the interval [min{ĉ i ,ĉ(b)},b] that is differentiable with a strictly positive derivative everywhere over this interval, except possibly atĉ i or when its value is equal tob, and such that the inverse bid functionsĉ i for all i ∈ J of these extensions, where differentiable, satisfy the system in (12) with the upper boundary condition
for all, except possibly one, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the lower boundary conditionĉ
for all i ∈ J, whereĉ(b) is defined as follows:
and there exists one and only one k(b) ∈ {2, . . . , n} such that c k(b) <b and
The intuition behind the upper boundary condition is that the NO bids their cost-hat when their probability of winning is zero. Ignoring the minimum operator, the intuition behind the lower boundary condition, on the other hand, is that the lowest bid-hat of each NO is reached for their lowest cost-hat.
Since both w and r i are assumed to be given to the NOs (i.e., they cannot directly modify their values), the costs-hat and bids-hat are simply convex (and hence, linear) combinations involving costs and bids, respectively [see (8) and (10)]. Therefore, an NO bidding their cost-hat is equivalent to bidding their cost, and we immediately deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 4: There exists one and only one pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium where NOs submit at least their costs.
However, although the equilibrium exists and is unique, the establishment of a closed-form solution in a generic setting (n NOs and arbitrary cost distributions) is particularly challenging [31] , [41] .
D. Restricted Case n = 2
It is possible to explicitly derive the equilibrium bidding strategy functions in a much restricted setting. Let n = 2, and assume that costs c i for both NOs are drawn from the uniform distribution. Given the lack of knowledge of the way the costs are distributed, we assume the probability of each cost to be equal, which is a standard practice under similar circumstances [42] . Furthermore, for technical reasons, we impose continuity on the distribution, and therefore assume that the costs are drawn from the uniform distribution.
The utility function for each NO i ∈ {1, 2} is
Without loss of generality, suppose that r 1 < r 2 . Since the distribution of costs c i for each NO i is uniform with the support [0, 1], (10) implies that the distribution of costshatĉ i for each NO i is uniform with the support
. Therefore, the distribution function of costs-hat satisfies the regularity conditions specified in Proposition 2, and by Corollary 4, we conclude that the purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium where NOs submit at least their costs exists and is unique.
The derivation of the equilibrium involves three stages: 1) deriving equilibrium inverse bidding strategy functions using the procedure described by Kaplan and Zamir [38] ; 2) numerically estimating the equilibrium bidding strategy functions by inverting the inverses; and 3) transforming the problem back to the original domain (from costs-hat and bids-hat back to costs and bids).
First, note that, by (13) in Proposition 3, the upper bound on bids is equal tob = (c 1 +c 2 /2) where we have used the fact that F 2 is the distribution function of the uniform distribution with support [ĉ 2 ,c 2 ]. Ifb ≤ĉ 2 ⇐⇒c 1 ≤ 2ĉ 2 −c 2 , then, by Proposition 3, NO 2 does not belong to the set of feasible bidders J. In this case, any pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium must have NO 1 to be always biddingĉ 2 and, hence, to be always winning the auction at priceĉ 2 [38] . This case shall be referred to as trivial. Otherwise, in the non-trivial case, by Proposition 3, the inverse equilibrium bidding functions are determined by the following system: (16) with boundary conditionsĉ 1 (b) =ĉ 1 andĉ 1 (b) =c 1 for NO 1, andĉ 2 (b) =ĉ 2 andĉ 2 (b) =b for NO 2.
Integrating the system (16) bounded by the aforementioned boundary conditions results in the derivation of the equilibrium inverse bidding strategy functions. The derivation procedure is fully described in [38] ; hence, we only provide the final result. 
where
Note that the equilibrium inverse bidding strategy functions are inconvenient to work with. For a particular bid-hat value, they map into a particular cost-hat for either NO. It would be more intuitive to work with their inverses, where for a particular cost-hat, we would get a particular bid-hat. Since it is difficult to analytically invert the equilibrium inverse bidding strategy functions in (17) and (18), we resort to numerical methods for estimating the inverses for a particular set of cost-reputation pairs with respect to the price weights for both NOs. Without loss of generality, assume that r 1 < r 2 . The numerical procedure is then as follows. The result of the aforementioned steps is the tabulation of the costs-hat and their corresponding equilibrium bids-hat for a particular price weight w and reputation ratings r 1 and r 2 for both NOs, in the ranges [ĉ 1 ,c 1 ] and [ĉ 2 ,c 2 ] for NOs 1 and 2, respectively.
1) For a particular price weight
Denote byb
the resultant equilibrium bidding strategy functions. The problem can be transformed back into the original domain by substituting (8) and (10) into (22) and (23), i.e.,
for all c 2 ∈ [0, 1], and
for all c 2 ∈ [0, 1]. Keeping costs and reputation ratings fixed, one can then estimate the equilibrium bidding strategy functions with respect to the price weights by sliding the value of w ∈ (0, 1). By way of example, the equilibrium bidding strategy functions were estimated for the set of cost-reputation pairs shown in Table I . Fig. 1 shows the value of the compound bid β(b i r i ) for different values of w for both NOs, whereas Fig. 2 shows the value of the monetary bid (or offered price) b i for different values of w for both NOs. The numerical data in Table I suggests that NO 2 should be the winner for the values of w → 1 since the cost of NO 2 is strictly lower than that of their opponent. On the other hand, NO 1 should be the winner for the values of w → 0 since the reputation rating of NO 1 is strictly lower than that of their opponent (which implies that the reputation of NO 1 is in fact strictly higher than that of their opponent). This prediction agrees with the numerical output shown in Fig. 1 . Let w c denote the value of w for which an intersection between the compound bids of both NOs occurs (if it exists). In Fig. 1, w c ≈ 0 .365. Hence, NO 2 wins the auction for w c < w < 1, whereas NO 1 for 0 < w < w c .
Furthermore, note that, since we have explicitly required the NOs to bid their own costs when their probability of winning is zero, the monetary bid of NO 2 is capped at their cost, b 2 = 0.25, for 0 < w ≤ w 0 , where w 0 ≈ 0.265 (see Fig. 2 ). In the same range of w, as w decreases, NO 1's bid increases in an exponential-like fashion, to finally culminate in b 1 → ∞ at w = 0 in accordance with Part 1 of Theorem 1. As w → 1, on the other hand, the monetary bids of both NOs tend to the values specified in Part 2 of Theorem 1, i.e., b 1 = 0.875 and b 2 = 0.625, to finally attain those values at w = 1.
E. Expected Prices in the Restricted Case
Having derived the equilibrium bidding strategy functions in the restricted case, it is possible to examine the expected prices that the subscriber will have to pay for different values of the price weight given the reputation ratings of the NOs. To this end, suppose that all of the assumptions of Section IV-D hold, i.e., there are two NOs, and costs are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. The expected price is equivalent to the expected value of the winning bid, i.e., with some abuse of notation regardless of the choice of the price weight, the subscriber expects to pay the price of
which is equivalent to (7) evaluated at n = 2. In particular, for costs c i , uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1], E[p * ] = 2/3. On the other hand, if both NOs are characterized by different reputation ratings, then an analytical derivation of the expected prices for each value of the price weight given a pair of reputation ratings is cumbersome. This is due to the fact that NOs bid according to a pair of inverse equilibrium bidding functions specified in Proposition 5, which are not easily invertible. Hence, we resort to numerical methods for estimating average (sample mean) prices for selected values of the price weight given a pair of reputation ratings.
To this end, for any given pair of reputation ratings, the costs are pseudorandomly drawn from the uniform distribution over the discretized interval [0, 1]. For each selected price weight, the average price is averaged over 10 000 i.i.d. observations. The strong law of large numbers implies that, as the number of observations tends to infinity, the average (sample mean) of the observations approaches the real mean of the distribution of the random variable in question. Therefore, an average of 10 000 observations of the price for each selected price weight should provide a reasonable approximation of the expected price for that price weight. Without loss of generality, suppose further that r 1 ≤ r 2 . Fig. 3 shows the result of the estimation for four pairs of reputation ratings: (r 1 , r 2 ) = (0.25, 0.25), (0.25, 0.5), (0.25, 0.75), (0.25, 1.0).
It can be observed that, regardless of the values of the reputation ratings, the expected prices E[p](w, r 1 , r 2 ) are bounded from below by E[p * ] for each price weight; this is shown in Fig. 3 . Hence, it can be concluded that, regardless of the values of the reputation ratings, the lowest expected price is achieved Fig. 4 . Sensitivity of the price weight to the expected prices.
for w = 1 and will not decrease as w decreases; in fact, it can only either increase or remain constant.
Furthermore, as the difference (r 2 − r 1 ) increases, expected prices E[p](w, r 1 , r 2 ) increase as the price weight decreases; this is shown in Fig. 3 . Therefore, it can be inferred that the smaller the difference (r 2 − r 1 ) is, the less (expected) price sensitive the price weight will be; that is, for any Fig. 4 ). In other words, for any expected price, as the difference (r 2 − r 1 ) between the reputation ratings of the NOs increases, the price weight has to increase (or remain constant) to keep the expected price fixed.
F. Numerical Analysis of Case n > 2
The system of ODEs (12) together with upper and lower boundary conditions (14) and (15) does not possess any known closed-form solution in a generic setting, particularly when n > 2. However, there exists a considerable research base studying methods for numerical approximation of the solution to the system of ODEs in question. (See [43] for an excellent overview of the subject.)
The literature is mostly concerned with asymmetric firstprice auctions in which the bidders are characterized by different probability distributions sharing a common support, i.e.,
This is not true in our case. Therefore, the methods described in [43] have to be adapted before they can be applied to our problem.
However, both scenarios (the one considered in the literature and the one at hand) share a common difficulty, i.e., the common lower bound on bidsb is unknown a priori [43] . On the other hand, since the common upper bound on bidsb is known a priori, it would seem that any well-known finite-difference method, such as Euler or Runge-Kutta methods, could be applied to the system of ODEs (12) with the upper bound on bids as a starting point (the so-called terminal value problem as opposed to the more common initial value problem). As shown in [43] , the system does not satisfy the Lipschitz condition for continuity as we approach the upper bound on bids. Therefore, much of the theory of ODEs no longer applies. In practice, this effectively means that the numerical solution obtained using a finite-difference method applied to the terminal value problem will quickly diverge.
Here, we shall consider two numerical algorithms that overcome the aforementioned problem, i.e., the forward shooting method (FSM), and the polynomial projection method (PPM), both of which were first proposed by Bajari [44] . To this end, let costs c i be drawn from a uniform distribution for all NOs, as in Section IV-D. We shall concentrate only on cases in which J = N , i.e.,ĉ i <b for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, we shall concentrate on cases such thatĉ i ≤ĉ(b) for all i ∈ N . This requirement simplifies the problem so that it is numerically tractable using (slightly modified) existing numerical methods. More specifically, it reduces the lower boundary condition (15) toĉ i (b) =ĉ i for all i ∈ N . Without this assumption, as shown by Lebrun [41] , there might exist i such thatĉ i (b) <ĉ i <b that forces bid functionb i to be extended to interval [ĉ(b),b], which is strictly larger than the actual support, truncated at b,
The main difficulty when considering such cases stems from the fact that, for all i ∈ I, where I = {i ∈ N |ĉ(b) <ĉ i <b}, the system of ODEs (12) reduces to
As further explained in [41] , the (inverse) equilibrium bidding functions are then determined by 27) for all NOs j ∈ N and j ∈ I, and by the system (26) for NOs i ∈ I. Both systems are combined for allb < b until common functionĉ i , i ∈ I, takes as its value the smallest lower extremity strictly smaller thanĉ(b). At the bid where this next smallest lower extremity is reached, the functionsĉ i of the NOs with this lower extremity of their supports are added to the system (27) . This process is repeated untilĉ i for all i ∈ N are included in (27) . This procedure is not easily accommodated by any of the numerical methods described in the literature or in this paper; hence, the assumptionĉ i ≤ĉ(b) for all i ∈ N .
1) Forward Shooting Method:
The idea behind the FSM is to find the best approximation of the lower bound on bids, e.g., b , by successively picking a value from the feasible interval (ĉ 2 ,b), and verifying whether a numerical solution to the initial value problem for all i ∈ N , lies within a set of permissible functions S i , such that every element of that set is a function mapping
It is monotonically increasing everywhere, except possibly atb, and each function value is strictly lower than its argument, except possibly atb, i.e.,
This specification of the problem is a modified version of the first Algorithm in Bajari [44] (cf. [44, Sec. 3.3] ) that accommodates for different lower and upper extremities in the supports of bidders' costs. The pseudocode for the FSM is shown in Fig. 5 . For any given tolerance ∈ (0,b −ĉ 2 ), the algorithm aims at finding
b ∈ LH and high − low < . The approximation to the lower bound on bids is then found to beb = 0.5 · (low + high).
The initial guess supplied to the algorithm is the interval [ĉ 2 ,b] . In every iteration, the guessed value for the lower bound on bids is the midpoint of the interval, i.e., guess = 0.5 · (low + high). The algorithm then uses this value as the new initial condition for the system in (28) . If the solution to the system lies within the set S i for all i ∈ N , then guess becomes the new upper endpoint of the interval LH, i.e., LH = [low, guess]. Otherwise, it becomes the new lower endpoint, i.e., LH = [guess, high]. This procedure is repeated until the length of the interval is smaller than . Furthermore, in each step, the system of ODEs (28) can be solved numerically using any type of finite-difference methods, such as Euler or Runge-Kutta methods.
2) Polynomial Projection Method:
In this method, we assume that the inverse equilibrium bidding function for each NO i ∈ N can be approximated by a Kth-order polynomial of the following form:
where K ∈ N + and K ≥ 2, and α i = (α i,1 , . . . , α i,K ) T is a K-tuple of unknown polynomial coefficients such that α i ∈ R K . The idea behind the method is then to employ a nonlinear optimization technique, such as the Nelder-Mead method, to find an approximation to the lower bound on bids and the set of polynomial coefficients that best satisfy the system of ODEs (12) with upper and lower boundary conditions (14) and (15) in the least squares sense. That is, minimize the least squares objective function
where B = {b, . . . ,b} is a (finite) grid of points uniformly spaced betweenb andb, |B| < ∞ denotes the cardinality of B, and G i captures NO i's first-order condition for profit maximization, which is defined as follows:
Note that G i (b;b, α 1 , . . . , α n ) = 0 corresponds to the ODE in (12) for each NO i ∈ N . This specification of the problem is a modified version of the third algorithm in [44] (see [44, Sec. 3.5] ) that accommodates for different lower and upper extremities in the supports of NOs' costs.
The pseudocode for the PPM is shown in Fig. 6 . The algorithm aims at refining the solution to the minimization problem in (30) by successively increasing the order of approximating polynomials. In each such iteration, the output from the previous run of the algorithm is used as the input to the next run. That is, suppose that (
is the output from the algorithm where kth-order polynomials were used. Then, this output is used as the input [and a starting point for the minimization problem in (30) ] to the next stage of the algorithm where (k + 1)th-order polynomials are used. This procedure is repeated until the approximating polynomials are of the desired order. Furthermore, in each step of the algorithm, the nonlinear optimization problem in (30) can be numerically solved using any nonlinear optimization technique, such as Nelder-Mead or Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno methods.
3) Approximation Results: Both FSM and PPM algorithms were implemented in the Haskell programming language, and their implementation was verified by comparing the numerical solution for two NOs with the analytical solution derived in Section IV-D. Furthermore, the results presented here were tested for sufficiency condition for equilibrium, i.e., whether the numerically derived bidding strategies constitute mutually consistent best responses. Fig. 7 shows the results of the numerical simulation for three NOs characterized by reputation ratings r 1 = 0.25, r 2 = 0.5, and r 3 = 0.75 and price weight w = 0.75 using the FSM approach, whereas Fig. 8 shows the results using the PPM approach. It is clear from the figures that both algorithms offer comparable level of accuracy in the neighborhood of the lower bound on bidsb. However, the FSM approach diverges in the close neighborhood of the upper bound on bidsb due to the fact that the system of ODEs (12) does not satisfy the Lipschitz condition for continuity for bid-hat values approaching the upper bound on bids [43] . The PPM approach, on the other hand, is stable across the entire range of bid-hat values since it approaches the problem from the (nonlinear) optimization perspective, hence removing all the shortcomings of the finitedifference methods (upon which the FSM is based).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the results of the analysis of the network selection mechanism in the DMP. This framework offers a market-based approach to the problem of intelligent network selection in heterogeneous wireless networks where the selection mechanism is based on a procurement firstprice sealed-bid auction, i.e., NOs represent the sellers/bidders, whereas the subscriber is the buyer. The mechanism gives the subscriber an opportunity to influence the bidding process so that the NO who matches the subscriber's needs is chosen, e.g., the operator who offers a low price for the service but at the expense of the quality, or the operator who offers a high quality of service but with a high price. This is accomplished through the choice of the so-called price weight w by the subscriber before each auction.
We have shown that, in a generic setting, i.e., with n NOs and arbitrary cost distributions, the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium where NOs submit at least their costs exists and is unique (see Section IV-C, Corollary 4). However, it is very difficult, if at all possible, to derive the closed-form expression of the equilibrium. After restricting the problem to a more specific setting, however, i.e., two NOs and uniform cost distributions, we have derived the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding functions for all values of the price weight (see Section IV-D, Proposition 5). It was shown that, for the values of the price weight approaching w = 0, the mechanism selects the NO offering high quality of the service but for a high price, whereas for the values of the price weight approaching w = 1, the mechanism selects the NO offering low price for the service but of a low quality.
In the restricted setting, we have also numerically established that, for any choice of the price weight by the subscriber and given any pair of reputation ratings, the expected prices should be bounded from below by E[p * ] = 2/3, which corresponds to the expected price for the choice of w = 1 or when both NOs are characterized by equal reputation ratings (see Section IV-E). Furthermore, we have inferred that the smaller the difference between the reputation ratings is, the less (expected) price sensitive the price weight will be.
Finally, we have shown that it is possible to numerically approximate the equilibrium bidding strategies for more than two NOs but only for a subset of parameters w and r i for all i ∈ N such thatĉ i <b andĉ i ≤ĉ(b) for all i ∈ N (see Section IV-F). To this end, we have presented two numerical algorithms, i.e., FSM and PPM, which generate a high-quality numerical approximation to the equilibrium bidding strategies.
APPENDIX PROOFS
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